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In the January, 1939, issue of this REVIEW,- Charles Parlin dis-
cussed the meaning of the term "accrual" in Section 42 of the Rev-
enue Act of 1934,2 and considered whether certain types of income,
such as fees of a law" partnership and commissions due a deceased
executor or trustee, had accrued so as to be included in the decedent's
last income tax return. Since that time the Supreme Court in Helver-
ing v. Estate of Enright 3 has held that "accrual" as used in Section
42 is to be interpreted, not in light of past cases dealing with accrual
of income, but in the light of the purpose of Congress in enacting
Section 42, namely, to cover into income items subject to the estate
tax but which might escape income taxation altogether. 'Mr. Parlin
pointed out that the Bureau of Internal Revenue was contending that
there was an accrual of income under Section 42 if it was "reasonably
probable that a determinable amount of money would be paid in the
future". Following the Enright decision, the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue is pressing that contention with renewed vigor, claiming that
there is an accrual under Section 42 if the decedent had any connec-
tion with the transaction, 4 or if there is any possibility of valuing the
decedent's right.5 Such claims make necessary a review of the decision
in the Enright case and of the cases following it.
The Enright Case
In the Enright case 6 the decedent was a partner in a law partner-
ship and after his death his interest under the partnership agreement
was computed by his partner Carpenter as follows:
t A. B., 1932, Princeton University; LL. B., 1935, University of Pennsylvania;
member of the Pennsylvania and New York Bars.
i. Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Puerposes (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 295. See also Farrand & Farrand, Treatment of Accrued Items in the Event of
the Death of a Taxpayer (1940) 13 So. CAIF. L. REv. 431.
2. This section provides: "In the case of the death of a taxpaper there shall be
included in computing net income for the taxable period in which falls the date of
death, amounts accrued up to the date of his death. . . ." 48 STAT. 694, 26 U. S. C.
A. § 42 (1934). This section was continued in the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938, and
in the Internal Revenue Code. 4[9 STAT. 1666 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § 42 (Supp.
1937) ; 52 STAT. 447, 26 U. S. C. A. § 42 (Supp. 1938) ; INT. Rav. CODE § 42.
3. 312 U. S. 636 (1941).
4. Estate of Taggart, C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. 12,167-C, Nov. 3, 1941 (memo.
opinion).
5. Estate of Francis Smyth, C. C. H. B. T. A. Sery., Dec. xi,842-E, May 3r, 1941
(memo. opinion).
6. 312 U. S. 636 (1941). The Court did not discuss the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 42. However, in view of the Court's decision against the taxpayer, the question
of constitutionality can no longer be considered open.
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i. Interest in fees collected $4,143.81
2. Interest in accounts receivable 2,055.55
3. Interest in estimated work 4o,855.77
Of the cases in the second and third group nine were being handled
on a fixed fee basis and in the remainder a reasonable fee was to be
paid for work done. As to fees contingent on the outcome of the
case, the evidence, as stated by the Board of Tax Appeals, was that
"only a few cases were being handled upon a contingent fee basis and
such cases Carpenter valued in his estimate at one dollar." 7 The
Board decided against the executors on the ground that the evidence
did rnot show which fees had accrued, and used Carpenter's estimates
in computing the tax due. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed on the ground that Section 42 did not require the
accounts of the partnership to be put on an accrual basis.8
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the Department of Justice
stated that the question was whether "income earned, but not yet
received" should be included in gross income. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Third Circuit Court, holding that the dece-
dent's death dissolved the partnership and the decedent's estate was
entitled to an accounting to date of death, and further, that the esti-
mated amount of fees had accrued. In defining "amount accrued"
the Court said:
"The meaning of 'amounts accrued up to the date of his death'
is clear as to fixed rent, interest, salary or wages for personal
services and other similar income which may readily be attributed
to a particular period. There are like deductions such as interest
and taxes. The uncertainty as to the meaning arises in the field
of personal service from items which cannot be accounted for on
a basis of successive equal units of time. Examples of the diffi-
culty are the value, prior to a successful result, of services ren-
dered on a contingent basis, done on a quantum meruit whether
that would or would not vary with the outcome, or exploratory
or preliminary steps looking towards final accomplishment."
7. C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. io,8o8-B, Aug. 28, 1939 (memo. opinion). The
question of the amount of the accrual remains. This amount should be the value of
the decedent's right on date of death and not the amount actually collected as the Com-
missioner has contended. Estate of Ledyard, 44 B. T. A. O62 (i94i). The Board
recognized this Rule in Estate of McGlue, C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. x2,234-D, Dec.
31, 1941 (memo. opinion), but held the accrual of executors' fees equalled the amount
actually collected and rejected testimony that no one would purchase the right to such
fees.
3. II2 F. C2d) oig (C. C. A. 3d, I940).
9. 312 U. S. 636, 643 (1941).
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After pointing out that the word "accrual" had no fixed meaning
in the law, the Court stated:
"Accruals here are to be construed in furtherance of the intent
of Congress to cover into income the assets of decedents, earned
during their life and unreported as income, which on a cash
return, would appear in the estate returns. Congress sought a
fair reflection of income." 
10
As to the items in question:
"'Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis, as
distinguished from the cash basis, import that it is the right to
receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of
the amount in gross income.' The completion of the work in
progress was necessary to fix the amount due but the right to
payment for work ordinarily arises on partial performance.
Accrued income under § 42 for uncompleted operations includes
the value of the services rendered by the decedent, capable of
approximate valuation whether based on the agreed compensation
or on quantum meruit." "3
Pfaff v. Commissioner,12 decided the same day as, and on the
basis of, the Enright case, held that the decedent's return should have
included the estimated value of fees of a medical partnership.
Particular note should be made of the fact that the Enright case
involved only collected but undistributed fees and fees for work done
on a fixed fee or quantum meruit basis, and that it did not involve
fees for work done on a purely contingent basis. The Court in the
sentence italicized above, points out that "accrual" here means the
right to income and that although completion of the work was neces-
sary to fix the amount of the compensation, the right to payment arose
as the work was done. Such is the nature of quantum meruit; a right
to compensation arises as the work progresses. 3 Here then is the deci-
sion of the Enright case-if the decedent was entitled, at the time of
his death; to payment for work done though the amount was not then
fixed, there is an accrual under Section 42. A distinction is to be
observed between income to which the decedent is entitled in some
amount, the amount to be fixed after his death, and cases in which it is
uncertain at the time of death whether the decedent will ever receive
any amount. Such being the rule of the Enright case, do the cases
following it apply that rule?
io. Id. at 644.
ii. Id. at 645. (Italics supplied.)
12. 312 U. S. 646 (i94i).
13. Sargent v. McLeod, 209 N. Y. 36o, IO3 N. E. 164 (1913).
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Fees of a Law Partnership
Fees of a law partnership are, at the time of death, generally of
the following types:
i. Collected but not distributed.
2. Billed but not collected.
3. Fixed on a monthly or yearly basis.
4. Based on value of work done.
5. Contingent on the outcome of the case.
That there is an accrual of the first four types of fees has been
settled by the Enright case. Patent attorneys often bill clients each
month on the basis of time spent on the client's matters. In this type
of case there would clearly be an accrual of the amount billed in the
year of death and the amount unbilled in the month of death to the
date of death. As to contingent fees, no right exists to payment of
any amount until completion of the case, and no right existing, there
is no accrual. The Enright case did not consider this type of fee and
in no case decided since the Enright case has it been held that there
would be an accrual under Section 42 of a contingent fee.14  In such
case there is no fixed right to payment of any amount at date of death.
Although such an expectancy might have value depending upon one's
appraisal of the case at hand, there is no accrual of income. If there
is not even an expectancy, of course there is no accrual. Such a case
was Peyton v. Commissioner.15 In that case the decedent was a mem-
ber of a law partnership which had entered into a fee agreement with
a client before the decedent's death, providing that payment of the
fee stated in the agreement was to be made one-half upon the release
of certain funds by the Court and one-half at the end of the litigation.
Practically all of the work was done after decedent's death and the
events upon which payment depended happened after the decedent's
14. In Estate of Wickersham, 44 B. T. A. 623 (941), the Board considered the
accrual of a decedent's interest in a law partnership, stating that the fees of the part-
nership which had accrued to a deceased partner under Section 4z consisted of periodic
retainers, of fees fixed by agreement and of fees for uncompleted work being done on
a quantum meruit basis. In Estate of Smyth, C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. II,842-E,
May 31, 1941 (memo. opinion), the Board held that there had been an accrual of fees
of a partnership which had been collected but not distributed, and of fees for work
being completed but on which no fee had been fixed. In Estate of Smith, C. C. H. B.
T. A. Serv., Dec. 11,848-B (memo. opinion), the Board held that there had been an
accrual of fees of a law partnership and stated "in none of the cases in question was
the firm retained on a contingent basis". In Estate of Ledyard, 44 B. T. A. io62
(1941), no amount was included under Section 42 for any work being done by the
decedent's law firm on a contingent basis. In all of these cases a right to some com-
pensation existed at the time of decedent's death; no uncertainty existed about the fact
that there would be some payment.
15. 44 B. T. A. 1248 (1941).
706 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
death. The firm did not consider that the decedent had any legal right
to share in the fee but paid an amount to his estate for moral reasons.
The Board distinguished the Enright case and held there had been no
accrual to the decedent under Section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1934.
Would the result have been different in the Enright case if the
partnership had been on the accrual basis? Prior to completion of
legal work, there is no ordinary accrual of income.16 Mr. Parlin has
pointed out that there can be an accrual when the fee is fixed and a bill
rendered, but work in the process of completion cannot be accrued.' 7
Hence, the result would be the same except as to items that might have
been included in a prior year's return by reason of this method of
accounting, and the Supreme Court so stated:
"This will cause the accrued items of partnership returns to be
included in the income tax return of a deceased partner, whether
the partnership method is accrual or cash." 18
Similarly, it would not matter that the partnership did not end
with decedent's death. The problem is to determine the decedent's
distributive share and that problem remains whether the partnership
terminates or not. An analogous situation was considered by the
Board in Estate of MacFarlane,"9 in which the partnership agreement
provided that upon death of one of two partners, the survivor should
own all the accounts receivable. While the facts as stated by the
Board do not show the precise interest the decedent had in the firm,
this interest was valued and treated as accrued income.
What then of a provision in the partnership agreement that a
deceased partner shall have no interest in the firm business, but his
estate shall continue as a partner for a specified period, or that life
insurance proceeds from policies on which the premiums were paid by
the firm be accepted in lieu of an interest in the firm. Or again, the
partnership agreement might provide that income during a specified
period be accepted in payment for the deceased partner's interest. In
none of these three cases could there be an accrual under Section 42
as all right in the firm business ends on death. Bull v. United States 20
controls the first case-the estate is a partner and income received by
it is estate income. Note that although the right to continue as a
partner has value, that fact should not result in an accrual under Sec-
tion 42. In the second case all right in the firm ceases and there is
16. Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes (i939) 87 U. OF
PA. L. RE.v 295, 307.
17. Ibid.
i8. 312 U. S. 636, 642-643 (941).
i9.' C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. i2,139-F, Oct. 21, 1941 (memo. opinion).
20. 303 U. S. 645 (1938).
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nothing to accrue. Nor could there be a purchase of the decedent's
interest in the firm as the premiums which were paid by the firm would
have been paid by the decedent and the proceeds of the life insurance
treated the same as any other proceeds from policies on which the dece-
dent paid premiums.21 In the third case, there is a sale of the partner-
ship interest to the surviving partners and the amount paid to the estate
is paid as capital.
22
Corporate Dividends
In this type of case it has been recognized that no accrual results
unless the relationship of debtor and creditor existed between the cor-
poration and the decedent at the time of death. If, under the local
law, the declaration of a dividend creates this relationship and the dece-
dent dies after that date but before the record date of the dividend,
there has been an accrual of income.23 On the other hand, if the dec-
laration of the dividend does not create a debtor-creditor relationship,
but that relationship arises only on the record date of the dividend and
the decedent dies between the date of declaration and the record date,
there is no accrual under Section 42.24
Trust Income
A trust instrument may provide that upon the death of the life
beneficiary, income is to be treated in one of three ways:
i. Income collected and unpaid, or income accrued, is to go
to the holder of the next estate.
2. Income collected but unpaid at date of death is to be paid
to estate of deceased beneficiary.
3. Income is to be accrued to date of death and is to be paid
to the estate of the deceased beneficiary only when
collected.
In the first case clearly no accrual results under Section 42. On
the other hand, in the second case, the income collected but unpaid
could constitute an accrual. In the third case, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bach v. Rothenries,2 5 decided on
21. See Paul Legallet, 41 B. T. A. 294 (1940); Estate of Mitchell, 37 B. T. A. i
(1938); M. W. Dobrzensky, 34 B. T. A. 305 (1936); PAul, FmamzAi. ESTATZ AND
GIFT TAXATION (ig42) § io.i8.
22. Bull v. United States, 303 U. S. 645 (1938) ; Estate of Nutter, 46 B. T. A. No.
4, Jan. 7, 1942.
23. Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 4th, i941); Com-
missioner v. Cohen, 121 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 5th, 194I).
24. Estate of Putnam, 45 B. T. A. No. 84, Oct. 28, 1941.
25. 124 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 3d, I94i), certiorari applied for, March 6, I942.
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December 8, 1941, held that there had been an accrual under Section
42 to the beneficiary of a trust which provided that the beneficiaries
were to receive income only when collected. In that case the accrual
was of the amount of income accrued on the trust assets and not col-
lected to the date of decedent's death. The Court held that there was
no legal contingency as to the decedent's right to the income and it
was in fact received by the decedent's estate.
Trustees Commission
As Mr. Parlin pointed out, before a deceased executor or trustee
is entitled to commission based on principal, his personal representa-
tive must "(a) render on behalf of the deceased executor an account,
(b) satisfy the beneficiaries and the court that the deceased properly
discharged his fiduciary duties, and (c) satisfy the beneficiaries and
the court that the services actually rendered by the deceased warrant
the allowance as requested." 26
Although the amount of trustees' commissions must be fixed or
approved by the Court having jurisdiction of the trust, the work has
been done by the decedent in his lifetime and the decedent is entitled
to some compensation unless it appears that the decedent's conduct as
trustee would prevent the Court from allowing any commissions.
Merely the amount remains uncertain. In Helvering v. McGlue's
Estate,27 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that such
fees had accrued under Section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1934. At
page 170 the Court stated:
"Certainly there is no contingency or uncertainty qualifying
respondent's right to at least a quantum meruit recovery. Cf.
Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Henrickson, D. C. W. D. Wash. 1938,
24 F. Supp. 256, appeal dismissed 9 Cir., 1939, IOO F. 2d 1015.
Under Section 42, respondent's claim was 'fixed', rather than
'inchoate' or 'in the process of becoming'."
In the foregoing quotation the Court recognizes that it is consid-
ering a case in which the right to some compensation has become fixed
during the decedent's lifetime and only the computation of the amount
remains to be done after his death.
The Board of Tax Appeals has recognized the same rule in
Estate of Wickersham 28 and Estate of Ledyard.29 The Board's deci-
26. Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes (1939) 87 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 295, 313.
27. 11g F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
28. 44 B. T. A. 623 (1941).
29. 44 B. T. A. lO62 (194I).
ACCRUALS TO DATE OF DEATH FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES 709
sion in Estate of Robinson 3 0 might appear to be contrary to that rule.
In that case the Board held there was an accrual of trustee's commis-
sions even though the decedent had agreed not to take any commis-
sions until the termination of the trust which, in fact, had not termi-
nated prior to his death. However, the facts show that no provision
was made regarding commissions if the decedent died before the ter-
mination of the trust. Under those circumstances the decedent was
entitled at the time of his death to some commission for the work
done to date of death and an amount was finally allowed by the Court.
Thus the right to some payment existed at the time of the decedent's
death.
Other Commissions
Commissions may be payable when an order is accepted or when
goods are shipped. If the order received by a decedent is accepted
before death and he is then entitled to a commission, income is then
accrued. If the commission is payable only when the goods are shipped
and the decedent dies before shipment, there should be no accrual. The.
decedent's right is still subject to contingency, namely, completion and
shipment of the goods. The Board considered this type of case in
Estate of Taggart,31 and held that there was an accrual. The decedent
had an oral arrangement with a pump company under which he was
entitled to commission on business received when pumps were shipped
and invoiced. Certain pumps were ordered through decedent before
his death. After his death the specifications for the pumps were
changed materially and the Board found that if the changes had not
been mutually satisfactory, neither party would have been liable. The
president of the seller company and the decedent's attorney testified
that decedent had no right to any commission at the time of his death
and no right at any time to any commission by reason of the transac-
tion. The amount paid decedent's executors was returned by them as
income. The Board admitted that if the changes made had not been
satisfactory, no payment would have been made but said the decisive
fact was that "the transaction was consummated and payment was
received", and then:
"Since we are of the opinion that enough was done toward the
placing of these orders before decedent's death to demonstrate
that his services were responsible for the payment ultimately made
to his estate, we cannot escape the conclusion that the proceeds
are taxable as his income earned by him through the connection
he had with the transaction while he was alive." 32
3o. C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. 12,253-A, Jan. I6, i'4 (memo. opinion).
31. C. C. H. B. T. A. Serv., Dec. i2,I67-C, Nov. 3, 1941 (memo. opinion).
32. Ibid.
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That case on its facts is contra Estate of Peyton 88 as the uncon-
tradicted evidence was that the decedent had no right to any commis-
sion. Moreover, as the facts fixing right to payment occurred after
the decedent's death, the case is contra the theory of Bull v. United
States.84 The Taggart case is the only case in which an accrual has
been found where no right to compensation existed at the time of
decedent's death.
Income Earned but Unreported
In Estate of Letz,85 the decedent had received notes for salary
for several years and had not reported the value of the notes as income.
Upon his death the Commissioner contended that all notes so received
were "accruals" under Section 42. The Board found that the notes
should have been reported by the decedent as income in the years when
they were received and hence were not items to be accrued in the
decedent's last return.
Pension Trust and Salary Agreement
As Mr. Parlin pointed out, any salary or profit-sharing agree-
ment that permitted computation of the amount to date of death, such
as an agreement calling for monthly compensation, results in an accrual
under Section 42. Similarly, a fixed salary to be paid for a fixed period
of years after date of death to decedent's estate or persons named by
the decedent would result in an accrual. Hence, it becomes necessary
to review all salary arrangements and pension trusts in the light of the
Enright case. What of a profit-sharing arrangement that calls for a
share of profit based on a year's operations? Fehrman v. Commis-
sioner,"6 decided before the Enright case, held Section 42 did not apply
to such a case. At the time of the decedent's death, all of the facts
fixing his right to compensation have not occurred. Operating losses
between the date of death and end of the year may well prevent any
payment. Such a contingency goes not alone to valuation of the right;
it goes also to the very existence of the right.
37
Insurance Agents
An insurance agent is, under his contract, entitled to a portion of
the first premium paid by the insured and to a percentage of subsequent
33. 44 B. T. A. 1248 (194).
34. 303 U. S. 645 (1938).
35. 45 B. T. A. No. 157, Dec. 16, 1941.
36. 38 B. T. A. 37 (1938).
37. Cf. Estate of Kirchner, 46 B. T. A. No. 71, March 11, 1942.
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premiums paid for a certain period. If the insured dies or cancels his
policy so that no premiums are paid, the agent receives no commission.
Considering such commissions which might be paid after deceased
agent's death, the Court held (before the Enright decision) in Seattle
First National Bank v. Henricksen,s8 that Section 42 did not apply.
In this type of case, although the decedent has done all the work
required, all of the facts necessary to fix decedent's right have not
occurred, and there would seem to be no accrual under Section 42.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the quotation set
forth above, referred to the Seattle First National Bank case as one to
be contrasted with cases involving trustee's commissions.
Moreover, in this type of case, it may be argued that there is no
income which escapes taxation, as income is not realized until each
premium is paid. At the time of the decedent's death he had an expec-
tancy of future income under his contract with the insurance com-
pany. The income was inchoate, in the process of becoming; noth-
ing had accrued at the time of his death. As in the case of dividends
which, under local law, become debts of the corporation only on the
record date, upon declaration of the dividend there is an expectancy
but unless the stock is held on the record date, there is no accrual.8 9
Other illustrations are rent and interest. Upon the decedent's death,
there is a right to rent or interest under the lease or bond and the rent
or interest collected thereafter is income to the decedent's estate.40 The
Commissioner has never contended that such rent or interest payable
over the whole term of the lease or bond constitutes an accrual at the
date of death.41 The dividends, rent or interest are severed from the
right to them and are income. So here, the decedent's rights under
the contract have value as do stock, leases or bonds, but the income
severed from that right does not exist at the date of death but comes
into being, or accrues, only when the premiums are paid by the insured.
Helvering v. Eubank,42 holding that an assignor of insurance
renewal premiums remains liable for taxation upon the commissions
when paid supports this view. In that case the assignor was not taxed
on the present right to receive income in the future at the time of the
assignment; the assignor was taxed in the year the commission was
paid to the assignee. Here the' Supreme Court recognizes that income
arises only when the commission is paid.
38. 24 F. Supp. 256 (W. D. Wash. 1938), appeal dis issed on i otion of defendant,
0oo F. (2d) IOI5 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
39. Estate of Putnam, 45 B. T. A. No. 84, Oct. 28, i941.
40. Cf. Maass v. Higgins, 312 U. S. 443 (1941).
41. I. T. 3343, 1940-I CUM. BULL. 21.
42. 311 U. S. 122 (940).
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Concisionr
As yet no decision (with the possible exception of Estate of Tag-
gert) has adopted the Commissioner's test of items being accruable if
it is reasonably probable an amount will be paid. Nevertheless, Sec-
tion 42 as requiring a piling up of income in the decedent's last return
is a harsh provision and unduly discriminates against a person who
earns income. Earned income for future years is taxed in one year,
while investment income from bonds or leases is taxed as it is received.
The Internal Revenue Code should be amended so as to tax the pay-
ments made after decedent's death as income when they are received.
To amend the Code would carry out the purpose of Congress in enact-
ing Section 42 to prevent such income from escaping taxation. In
order to avoid any constitutional question regarding such an amend-
ment it should give the taxpayer the option of reporting the income
under Section 42 or, upon filing a bond satisfactory to the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, of reporting as income when received the
amount which would have constituted income to the decedent if he had
lived and received such amount.43  Section 43 of the Internal Rev-
enue "Code should also be amended to disallow the accrual of deduc-
tions connected with income reported under the proposed amendment
to Section 42. The Treasury Department has now recommended to
Congress that the Internal Revenue Code be so amended 44 and the
Revenue Act of 1942 should contain such amendments.
43. The income would be reported under the proposed amendment on the taxpay-
er's usual accounting method, either the cash or accrual method.
The American Bar Association favors eliminating personal service income from
Section 42. At its 1941 meeting the House of Delegates approved a resolution of the
Section on Taxation that Section 42 be amended to read as follows:
"SErIoN 42. Period in Which Items of Gross Income Included.
"The amount of all items of gross income shall be included in the gross income
for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of
accounting permitted under section 41, any such amounts are to be properly ac-
counted for as of a different period. In the case of the death of a taxpayer there
shall be included in computing net income for the taxable period in which falls the
date of his death, amounts (other than undetermined amounts for personal serv-
ices) accrued up to the date of his death if not otherwise properly includable in
respect of such period or a prior period."
American Bar Association, Section on Taxation, Summary of Action Taken at Annual
Meeting in Indianapolis, Indiana, p. 14.
See also Paul, Suggested Income Tax Revisons., NAT AL TAX AssoCr ATIoN,
PRCEmINGS OF THIRTY-FOURTH NATIONAL CONFEExNCFF, 1941, pp. 381, 388.
44. Statement of Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury,
before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, March 3, 1942.
